This article is neither in favour nor against the construction of Kalabagh Dam (KBD). It merely attempts to examine the various factors that have made it into such a contentious issue.

In the KBD controversy the chasm between the ‘for’ and ‘against’ groups appear unfathomable. The majority of Pakistanis across the political divide agree that construction of dams over Indus has become an inescapable requirement and the federal government, with the support of the Punjab Provincial assembly, maintains that the construction of KBD must begin without further delay. However, the other three provincial assemblies insist that KBD must not be built at any cost and instead other dam sites should be explored, even if it amounts to further delay. According to the President, not constructing a dam on Indus soon will tantamount to Sindh committing suicide. The opposition maintains that constructing the KBD will lead to the murder of Sindh. How does one bridge such divergence of views? To better understand the oppositions’ point of view, it is necessary to comprehend what truly are the motives behind those opposing KBD. Broadly speaking they can be classified into three categories but before examining them a brief review of the history of Kalabagh Dam project would be pertinent.

History of Kalabagh Dam Project

The identification of Kalabagh as a suitable site for damming and harnessing river Indus for power generation and as a water reservoir was done way back in 1953. Serious study of dam construction was undertaken in 1962, after the famous Indus Basin Treaty was signed between India and Pakistan under the auspices of the World Bank. In the treaty, of the six rivers of Pakistan that emanate from India/Indian held Kashmir, the water of three western ones (Indus, Jehlum, Chenab) were meant exclusively for Pakistan, while the water of the other three eastern ones (Ravi, Sutlej, Beas) were given to India with the provision that India was permitted to dam the three western rivers for hydel power generations only but not for storage. Many leaders especially in Sindh are highly critical of the treaty accusing the Ayub Khan of a ‘sell out’. Ironically many Indians similarly accuse Nehru of a ‘sell out’ where exclusive rights of water of their three rivers had been acceded to Pakistan.

The critics of the treaty fail to appreciate that India was planning to divert waters from all six rivers to meet the growing agriculture needs of East Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan. If a compromise solution under the aegis and guarantee of the World Bank had not been brokered, India being the bigger, more powerful neighbour and the upper riparian could have destroyed Pakistan’s economy by denying it its share of water. A debilitating war for the very survival of Pakistan would have become inevitable. The treaty thus prevented a major catastrophe in the region.

Following the Indus Basin Treaty, the World Bank assisted Pakistan in construction of dams, link canals and barrages to make up for the loss of the three eastern rivers. Mangla, Kalabagh and Tarbela were the sites identified where large dams both for hydel power and water storage could be built. Mangla was the first to get completed. Kalabagh was the next in line but the Ayub government preferred Tarbela ostensibly because it was a bigger and more expensive project and the World Bank had agreed to provide loans for its financing. The government thought that such a large loan may not be forthcoming in the future and since Kalabagh required far lesser resources by comparison, it could be completed in the next phase.

Tarbela Dam was completed in 1973 during the government of ZA Bhutto. There are reasons to believe that if his government had stayed in power, construction of KBD would have commenced in the late 1970s. Zia’s military government from 1978 to 1985 was too preoccupied in its first seven years with other issues. KBD came back into focus in 1985 when Junejo was the PM but by then the entire project had become controversial. Sindh opposed it because it did not want to hand over control of river Indus, its only source of water to Punjab. NWFP opposed it as they were led to believe that a large portion of their fertile land would be adversely affected. Since then the position has continued to harden further with Punjab vociferously pleading for KBD and Sindh and NWFP opposing it with equal ferocity.

From 1990 onwards opposition to KBD by Sindh and NWFP became a battle cry for political parties against what they portray as Punjab’s big brotherly attitude towards the other three provinces. Baluchistan, the fourth and the smallest member of the federation, had little to gain or lose with the construction of KBD but they decided to side with Sindh and NWFP to show their solidarity with the smaller provinces.

Those genuinely opposed to KBD

This group is convinced that Kalabagh Dam is not technically feasible and the environmental damage it will cause will exceed the benefits. They maintain that not enough water exists in the Indus River to justify the enormous financial and ecological cost that will be incurred in the dam construction. They dispute the water statistics as given by WAPDA. They further maintain that the adverse impact on the nation’s environment that will result if the Indus is dammed at Kalabagh will be far more damaging than the likely benefits in terms of water availability and inexpensive hydel power generation. They cite the experience of USA where the enthusiasm for construction of large dams has waned considerably because of the long-term negative impacts on to the overall ecology.

Those opposed to KBD out of mistrust

A sizeable number of people in Sindh oppose KBD because they are very apprehensive about giving Punjab the control over the flow of Indus River as a result of the construction of the dam. They point out to a number of serious violations of water treaties among the provinces in the past by Punjab that has hurt Sindh.  This group may be willing to concede the technical and financial viability of KBD but refuse to support it because of lack of trust. 

Those who oppose KBD for their own agendas

All opposition parties fall under this category. For them every act of the party in power has to be condemned. In the anti-dam rally held in Karachi on December 22 there were representatives of a political party whose leader when in power had boasted of exploding another bomb in the shape of construction of KBD immediately after the nuclear explosion in May 1998. The rally had been organised by a party which had been partial to the cause of KBD when in power in the centre but opposed it when out of power.

To be fair to the opposition, their actions have been conditioned by the socio-political culture in the country. Pakistan’s turbulent history has not let democracy take a firm root even 58 years after independence. Even when the government is under some form of democratic setup the conditions for a sustainable democracy are not there resulting in periodic derailing of the entire process. Democracy can only function through free and fair elections. An independent judiciary and election commission are the minimum requirements for the process to succeed. Unfortunately in Pakistan all state institutions including these two vital ones remain subservient to the government in power. Under such a dispensation the likelihood of the opposition defeating a sitting government in an election is remote. No political government since 1972 (with the sole exception of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s first term) has completed its constitutionally approved period - they were either dismissed or overthrown. The resultant elections had invariably resulted in the will of the establishment prevailing over the will of the people. Agitation is the only option open to the opposition.

The dilemma

President General Musharraf is convinced that any further delay in the construction of the KBD will seriously hurt Pakistan’s economy in the near future. He is aware of the fierce opposition to KBD by the three provinces and that the issue will bring to the fore major inter provisional fault lines which can destabilize the current political set up and jeopardize the entire federation. Yet he has chosen to run the gauntlet. He feels not confronting the challenge would be even more harmful for Pakistan. He has embarked on a nationwide campaign with all technical facts and figures to appeal directly to the people especially the younger generation about the urgent need to build KBD. Will he succeed? What would be the outcome if he orders a presidential directive for commencement of KBD without bringing the three dissenting provincial assemblies on board? Is his present strategy likely to yield positive results and how will his standing get impaired if he is eventually made to abandon the KBD project?

There are three categories of dissenters. With the first, a rational debate is possible and agreement can be reached one way or the other.

With the second group, the success would revolve around confidence building measures. Punjab has to accept that serious inter provincial water accord violations had taken place earlier and concrete steps need to be put in place to prevent recurrence. One of the major objections to KBD by Sindh is the construction of right and left bank canals that are to emanate from KBD. Without elimination of these canals from the master plan, Sindh is unlikely to be convinced that Punjab will not divert its share of water especially during lean periods. Punjab has conceded to Sindh’s demands and if KBD is planned without the east and west canals, it may be possible to reach a consensus with this group provided other mutually accepted guarantees are also put in place.

Besides generation of hydel power, KBD is attractive to Punjab because these two canals would have brought large tracts of land in Southern NWFP and Punjab under cultivation. If these two canals are eliminated from the design, it is possible that Punjab may no longer pursue KBD with the same degree of zeal.

The third group is the most difficult one as it is motivated not so much because of the ill effects of KBD but because it is a handy subject that can be exploited to rally the masses against the ruling party. In a TV talk show, a dissenter was asked if he would reconsider his stance if technical statistics prove that KBD is beneficial to all provinces. His answer was an emphatic no: regardless of what the statistics show KBD would be opposed. This group will only change their stance if they can regain power in the centre. Should that happen, they will sing a different tune.

The third group may be a small minority but they are the elected members of the assemblies and theoretically represent the will of the people of their constituencies. They have the ability to rouse people’s sentiments against the government and without bringing them on board, any decision to build KBD would violate the spirit of democracy. While some of them can be coerced or can even be bought, they cannot be convinced through logic.

The president has embarked on an extremely slippery path where success is not guaranteed. While his whirlwind campaign in support of KBD may convince many Pakistanis about the utility and urgent need for its construction, it is unlikely to have much impact on the dissenting legislators. Disregarding the bills of disapproval by three of the four provinces of the federation would be unwise. Eventually the matter has to be taken up on the floors of the assemblies and there the fate of the KBD will be decided. It will be a long drawn process involving much give and take.

Where do we go from here?

TV and radio talk shows on the dam controversy have generally failed to educate the public on the issues involved. These invariably end up as point scoring session where one side can see no harm and the other no good. It would help if neutral experts rather than government and opposition air their views more frequently.

Water resources are already scarce and with the burgeoning population this precious commodity will get scarcer. Increased availability of water has to be assured and the very survivability of the nation may hinge on this single factor. Nobody in Pakistan denies this aspect but its people would like to know if building of large water reservoirs are the only available options. Large dams involve massive capital investment and have a large gestation period. There are also socio and ecological prices that have to be paid when natural flow of the river is obstructed through man-made structures. This is not to suggest that dams should not be built, but that alternate means to alleviate the water shortage may also be investigated.

Brick Lining of Canals: Experts opine that 30 to 50% of our water is lost due to seepage because the majority of canals are not brick lined. Besides the loss of the precious commodity, seepage results in water logging and salinity, laying thousand of acres of otherwise fertile cultivable land waste. Even if a partial accomplishment of brick lining saves us 20% of water losses it should amount to more than the storage capacity of one KBD. If the project can help alleviate the water shortage and prevent the nation from a severe water crisis ten years down the road, should it not be undertaken on a war footing concurrently with the planning of large dams?

Economical Use of Water: Pakistan has an elaborate canal network system and flood irrigation is employed for irrigation. However, it is an extremely wasteful use of water. Three decades ago when fresh water was available in abundance Pakistan could afford the luxury of flood irrigation; it can do so no more. Pakistan must gradually shift to more economical modes of irrigation. Israel has demonstrated that with scant water from river Jordan, it has made deserts bloom through the adoption of drip system. Jordan is following suit. We too eventually will have to change our old wasteful ways to overcome the ever-growing water shortage. Besides agriculture, our cities’ water systems are extremely wasteful because of numerous seepages. A revamping of the water system of our cities besides setting up recycling plants for reclaiming used water and establishment of desalination plants to meet the requirements of coastal cities is inescapable. Not to do so is not an option.

Enhancement of Tarbela & Mangla Capacity: Both Tarbela and Mangla storage capacity has shrunk and will continue to shrink due to natural silting. The height of Mangla dam is being raised but in due course silting will further erode its capacity. Dredging may be unfeasible purely from a financial viewpoint. Other techniques like construction of special tunnels for silt removal may be looked into. Desilting of the existing dams will enhance their storage capacity.

Large dams serve dual purpose of electricity generation and water storage. Brick lining of canals, more efficient use of water and desilting of existing dams will help overcome the water shortage but the need to tap hydel power for generation of affordable and environmental friendly energy would remain. Only dams can fulfil this void. The search for suitable sites for hydel power generation by construction of large or small dams must continue.

One hopes the President succeeds in building a consensus on the big dams. If majority agree that Kalabagh Dam is the one whose construction will benefit the whole federation, KBD should be built. Reaching a consensus is not certain and even if it does eventually occur it will take time. Work on alternate dam sites must continue. Construction of large dams notwithstanding, the effort to enhance the capacity of the present ones and more efficient water management techniques both in the rural and urban areas must be relentlessly pursued.